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FEE SHIFTING IN CRIMINAL CASES
PAMELA

S. KARLAN*

Like Moliere's M. Jourdain, who had been speaking prose for a
lifetime without knowing it,1 the United States has adopted a feeshifting regime for most criminal defendants without seeing it quite
that way. Since Gideon,2 most defendants' fees have been borne by
their opponent-the government-because the Constitution requires
the appointment of counsel for those defendants who are unable to
afford retained counsel. Estimates of the percentage of criminal defendants represented by appointed counsel (that is, defendants who
benefit from this automatic fee shifting) generally hover around seventy-five to eighty percent. 3 Unlike any other fee-shifting regime, this
4
shift occurs regardless of the outcome of a defendant's case.
By contrast to the indigent defendant, a defendant who is economically ineligible for appointed counsel must bear the cost of his
defense regardless of the outcome. 5 Thus, we have two categorical
regimes: indigent defendants are always entitled to fee shifting; nonindigent defendants (a rather elastic term) are never entitled to it.
This Article asks whether fee shifting should be extended to cases
involving retained counsel. Part I begins with a simplified account of
client and attorney decisions about how much to invest in a defense.
This account suggests several circumstances under which defendants
* Professor of Law and Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Research Professor,
University of Virginia. I thank John Jeffries, Bruce Hay, John Lariccia, Tom Lockney, Danny
Richman, and Bill Stuntz for helpful comments, suggestions, and information, and Liz Tucci and
Christy Lillquist for research assistance.
1. JEAN BAPTIsTE POOUELIN MOLIERE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, act 2, sc. 4, 1. 34

(1670).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966) (requiring that indigent suspects who request lawyers receive appointed
counsel before undergoing custodial interrogation).
3. See, e.g., J. THOMAS McEWEN & ELAINE NUGENT, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM:
SURVEy RESULTS FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS 2 (1990); Andy Court, Is There a Crisis?, AM. LAW.,

Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 46, 46.
4. But cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (Michie 1995) (requiring an indigent defendant who
is later convicted to pay the costs of prosecution, including the cost of appointed counsel).
Many states have recoupment statutes that provide for a lien against the defendant's assets.
See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.8(0 (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-40 (Law. Co-op.
1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-40-11 (1995); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).

5. See Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 112-13 (1995). The
one exception-government officials who are investigated but never indicted by an independent
counsel-is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 59-64.
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will choose not to invest additional resources in their defense. Sometimes, this decision will be both rational and socially beneficial: for
example, a factually and legally guilty person with no plausible defenses to the charges against him may instruct his lawyer simply to
negotiate the best possible plea; any money that he spends on attorney's fees beyond the minimum does little more than increase the
"fine" he ultimately pays for his offense. By contrast, precisely because attorney's fees function as a fine-imposed on the basis of a
prosecutorial suspicion or, if incurred after indictment, on the basis of
a finding of probable cause-a defendant may sometimes spend too
little on his defense if he believes such spending will change the allocation, but not the amount, of his loss.
In Part II, I identify situations in which society has a significant
stake in having defendants invest in a defense: those involving claims
that will vindicate important public values and those involving government misconduct. I suggest that defendants whose cases raise questions about the permissible extent of criminal sanctions and
defendants whose defense costs have been inflated by the government's culpable conduct should be entitled to recoup the costs of their
defense from the government. In addition, my analysis suggests that
cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel might justify refunding a defendant's expenditures.
In Part III, I take up the question of acquitted defendants. Contrary to the intuition that acquittal at trial offers the most compelling
rationale for fee shifting, I suggest that the difference between the
standard for investigation and prosecution (reasonable suspicion and
probable cause) and the standard for conviction (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) means that at least some portion of prosecutions that
end in acquittal, perhaps even the majority, were nevertheless justifiable, and that fee shifting might in such cases disserve a constellation
of interests.
I.

A

THEORY OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

The resources that will be expended in defending against a criminal prosecution depend on a series of choices made by defendants and
their lawyers. 6 The client's decision involves several considerations.
6. In this account, I start with a situation in which the defendant has already been charged
with a particular offense. Starting from an earlier point in the process-the time when an individual learns he is a suspect, or even the time when he is trying to decide whether to commit a
crime-would complicate the analysis without, I think, changing the basic point.
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First, what are the consequences of conviction? Some of these consequences-for example, the amount of a fine or forfeiture-are expressed in straightforward financial terms. Others can be quantified:
for example, the amount of income foregone either during a period of
imprisonment or as the result of the inferior job prospects of ex-cons.
And some, such as the loss of freedom or status are, designedly, hard
to quantify. Second, what is the likelihood of conviction? Third, and
of most concern to us, how will the expenditure of resources on a defense affect the likelihood of conviction? These resources involve the
defendant's time, effort, and emotional commitment, but they consist
largely of financial expenditures on lawyers, investigators, tests, and
the like.
Of course, the inquiry is complicated by a host of uncertainties.
Roughly speaking, however, an individual will spend money on his
defense until spending another dollar is no longer justified, either because it will not save a dollar of conviction costs or because that dollar
is better spent elsewhere. For example, with regard to a regulatory
offense to which no significant reputational consequences attach, a defendant might be unlikely to spend $10,000 on attorney's fees to avoid
a $1,000 fine. 7 Similarly, unless a defendant's preference for avoiding
conviction overrides all other interests in his life, he may decline to
spend an additional $5,000 on his defense if that money decreases the
likelihood of conviction by only an infinitesimal amount but would
represent a substantial drain on his family's assets. 8
The simplest case for understanding client decision making is the
indigent defendant. The cost-to him-of mounting a defense approaches zero. The money allocated to defense expenditures is nontransferable: the government pays for a lawyer; it does not give him
the money directly. 9 Every additional dollar spent on defending an
indigent defendant presumably decreases the probability of convic7. A defendant might choose to spend the $10,000 if he or his company feared the threat of
future prosecutions: under some circumstances, it would be worthwhile to get a reputation for
fighting every charge to the hilt thereby scaring off future prosecutions. In some civil contexts,
for example, defendants will often "overspend" in a bellwether case precisely because it may
deter other litigants. On the other hand, there are no doubt many cases in which a defendant
will fight harder to avoid a $1,000 criminal fine-precisely because of the reputational consequences inherent in a criminal conviction-than he would fight to avoid a $1,000 civil penalty or
damages of $1,000.
8. Cf.Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 595,60506 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan, Contingent Fees] (suggesting that a defendant may prefer conserving his assets for his family to spending them on an ultimately unsuccessful defense).
9. Even under proposed voucher systems, the defendant would be unable to translate the
government's payment into cash. See Stephen J.Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking
Indigent Defense: PromotingEffective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Free-
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tion; thus, an indigent defendant will demand limitless defense expenditures 10 even if it is not cost-effective to spend the additional
dollar. The defendant prefers this additional expenditure because
otherwise the defendant will bear the conviction cost and because the
government does not give the defendant the option to spend the
money elsewhere.11
Despite this preference, however, indigent defendants seldom
present an exhaustive, or often even an adequate, defense. 12 The primary explanation lies in the fact that the real decision makers about
indigent defense expenditures are the government and appointed
counsel. The government's commitment is usually grudging, to put it

charitably: most jurisdictions use counsel appointed on a case-by-case
basis and impose pitifully low caps on the amount of total compensation.1 3 Given their huge caseloads and the economic pressures for

quick turnover, appointed counsel face tremendous disincentives for
thorough investigation and extensive pretrial litigation; they often survive only by pleading a huge portion of their clientele guilty as quickly
as possible. 14 Of course, prosecutors with huge caseloads operate
under a comparable set of constraints, but they are unlikely to offer
their best "discounts" for pleading guilty to defendants whose lawyers
depend on high-volume practices since the likelihood of being forced
to trial is so low.
dom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 112-17 (1993) (discussing
voucher systems).
10. This is not to say that every dollar spent will decrease the probability of conviction:
some dollars will be wasted and some dollars may turn out after the fact to be superfluous. The
defendant's probabilistic calculus will view each dollar as worth spending unless it poses a threat
of actually increasing the likelihood of conviction.
11. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 49 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the
result) (suggesting that there are misdemeanor cases in which nonindigent defendants would
decline to retain counsel); Frank H. Easterbrook, CriminalProcedureas a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289, 310 (1983) (arguing that "defendants who receive free counsel gain relative to
other defendants" in a system of plea bargaining); cf.John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An
Attack on the Constitution, 19 HoFsTRA L. REV. 1229, 1235 (1991) (suggesting that "[i]f given the
option, the poor might very well prefer a cash payment in lieu of legal services").
12. For discussions of the quality of defense indigent persons receive, see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 137
(1986); Albert L. Vreeland, II, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation,90 MICH. L. REV. 626 (1991).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1994) (limiting total compensation for appointed counsel in
federal cases to $3,500 with an exception in the case of "extended or complex representation");
CriminalJustice Act. Hearingson H.R. 3233 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,and
the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 54
(1983) (statement of Theodore J. Lidz) (stating that fewer than 15% of applications for compensation beyond the cap were approved); Vreeland, supra note 12, at 627-28 (analyzing state statutes and explaining that "most states impos[e] a limitation on felony cases between $500 and

$1000").
14. See Richman, supra note 5, at 75.
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The decisions of extremely affluent defendants are only a little
more complicated. These defendants will presumably spend the costeffective amount. To the extent that they have strong preferences for
avoiding costs of conviction such as imprisonment or loss of reputation (and this preference may approach lexical priority), this amount
will be very great indeed: one can imagine a wealthy defendant spending $10,000 to avoid even a one percent chance of spending a night in
jail. 15 These defendants will choose the best possible lawyer, negotiate a fee arrangement that gives her incentives to leave no stone unturned, 16 and expend whatever amount is necessary on investigators,
consultants, and the like. A skillful, well-paid lawyer is likely to undertake every cost-effective expenditure. Finally, defense expenditures may affect potential outcomes by influencing prosecutorial
behavior: a prosecutor with limited resources may become less likely
to pursue a case, or a particular charge, if the defendant signals his
17
willingness to litigate to the hilt.
The complicated cases involve "middling" defendants: individuals
who are neither indigent enough to qualify for appointed counsel nor
affluent enough for cost to be no object. Most defendants with retained counsel fall into this category. Wealth affects their choice of
15. Estimates regarding the defense costs in the Simpson and Menendez trials, as well as
the reported fee opinions in cases under the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99
(1994), suggest the magnitude of attorney's fees in complex criminal cases in which money is no
object. See, e.g., In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (awarding $272,352
for legal fees spent to avoid indictment); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (awarding $460,509 for legal fees spent to avoid indictment); In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415,
1418 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (awarding $861,589 for legal fees spent to avoid indictment);
Elizabeth Gleick, Rich Justice, PoorJustice: Did We Need O.J. To Remind Us That Money Makes
All the Difference-In the Trial and In the Verdict?, TIME, June 19, 1995, at 40, 40 (estimating
Simpson's defense cost as between $5 and $6 million); Seth Mydans, Judge Turns Down Menendez Request, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at A18 (estimated $1.9 million spent by defendants at
first trial); Jim Newton & Leslie Berger, U.S. Files Civil Rights Charges Against 4 Officers in
King Case Indictments, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al (four officers charged with beating Rodney King expended over $500,000 on their first trial).
16. Thus, a defendant with few cost constraints is much likelier to enter into a fee arrangement with a large retainer against which hourly charges are made than into a flat fee arrangement, since the latter provides less incentive for the lawyer to spend additional time on the case.
One further possibility-the use of a contingent performance bonus-is prohibited by ethical
rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-

FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980); Karlan, Contingent Fees, supra note 8, at 597602 (discussing the categorical ban on contingent fees in criminal cases).
17. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 685 (1992) [hereinafter Karlan, Discrete
and Relational Representation]; see also KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME:

A PORTRAIT OF ATITORNEYS AT WORK (1985); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract,101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1940-43 (1992). There may, of course, be cases in which
the very wealth or power of the defendant creates a political incentive for the prosecutor to
devote extra resources to the case. For a fictionalized account of this dynamic, see TOM WOLFE,
THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 104, 380 (1987).
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counsel in two important ways: first, they may simply be unable to
afford the very best criminal lawyers; second, they may wonder
18
whether the benefits of a more expensive lawyer are worth the cost.
Particularly if the cost of acquiring more funds-by borrowing them
from relatives or associates or by liquidating property such as real estate, pension funds, and the like-is very high, a defendant may
forego such efforts and "settle" for a lawyer who costs less, and who
may accordingly invest less time and fewer resources in the case.
Moreover, the middling defendant is particularly likely to enter
into the most common criminal defense fee arrangement-the fiat
fee. 19 Once the client has paid the fee, his costs are fixed and sunk;
thus, he has every reason to litigate his case to the hilt. In contrast, his
lawyer operates under precisely the opposite incentive: once the client
has paid the fee, her effective hourly rate decreases for each additional hour that she spends on the case. Thus, the lawyer is likely to
view an additional hour's work as not cost-effective some time before
her client would make that determination. She may thus be tempted
to sell a particular plea bargain to her client as the best that can be
done even if additional litigation or bargaining might result in a somewhat more favorable offer.
For the middling defendant, the critical fact to understand about
defense expenditures is that they are sunk costs whatever the outcome
of the case. The defense fees operate as a "fine," imposed on the basis
of a finding of probable cause rather than of proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 20 Some fine will have to be paid; only the magnitude of the fine depends on the defendant's choices, and it may depend in part on how hard he fights.

18. See Vincent W. Perini, Introduction to How

TO SET AND COLLECT ATrORNEY FEES IN

xiii (1985) [hereinafter ATTORNEY FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES]. I use the
word "wonder" deliberately. As a theoretical matter, it might well be worth using a lawyer
whose fee is 20% higher if this reduces the risk of conviction by 25%, but a client is exceedingly
unlikely to have reliable information on which to base such a calculation. Moreover, at the
outset of the case, when a client is picking an attorney, although he will in all likelihood know
whether he has committed the crimes of which he is suspected, he may be completely unaware of
the strength of the prosecutor's case, and thus unable to assess the possible significance of hiring
different "grades" of counsel.
19. See Karlan, ContingentFees, supra note 8, at 599; Vincent W. Perini, Setting and CollectCRIMINAL CASES xi,

ing Fees in Criminal Cases, in ATTORNEY FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 18, at 1, 4; Exploring the Labyrinth of Fee Setting, in ATTORNEY FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 18, at
13, 14.
20. Cf. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1974) (suggesting that defendants will be willing to
spend up to the amount of the likely fine to "avoid apprehension and conviction").
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Like his indigent and wealthy counterparts, a middling defendant's decision can be influenced by prosecutorial decisions. If, for example, the prosecutor offers the defendant an attractive plea
bargain-say, a guilty plea with a suspended sentence or probationthe defendant may become less willing to spend money on his defense,
in the form of going to trial and perhaps then appealing, since the cost
of conviction has just decreased. A risk-averse defendant may prefer
to pay a small fine, after incurring only relatively minor attorney's
fees, to the risk of a far larger fine, particularly combined with the
certainty of higher attorney's fees, win or lose. Thus, even a defendant
with a potentially winning defense may decide it is simply not worth
litigating his claim, particularly when his attorney advises him that the
prosecutor's offer is a reasonable one. The combination of the client's
and attorney's decisions about how much to spend will lead them to
forego at least some efforts, even some cost-effective ones.
Finally, the middling, or even the wealthy, defendant may simply
run out of money before the end of the criminal process, particularly if
his first trial ends in a hung jury or if his conviction is overturned on
appeal and he must be retried. 21 To the extent that price reflects quality, the result may be that on retrial the defendant is more likely to be
convicted because he has fewer resources to invest in his defense. 22
This may also change the plea bargaining dynamic, since a defendant
whose coffers have been depleted (or whose costs have risen in light
of the need to mount a second defense) may be more likely to accept
the prosecutor's offer, particularly in cases where the outcome of the
first trial indicates a greater likelihood of conviction at a subsequent
trial than the defendant had initially estimated.
II.

GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

As

PRIVATE ATITORNEYS GENERAL

Fee shifting has become an increasingly prevalent feature of the
American civil litigation system. Two standard justifications for fee
shifting center on influencing attorney behavior. First, the idea of the
21. The $14 million Menendez estate was depleted by creditors and the large legal fees paid
at the first Menendez brothers' trial. Thus, Leslie Abramson, who represented Eric Menendez
at the first trial, will be paid a maximum of $125,000 as court-appointed counsel for her client at
the second trial. Lawyer Reaches Deal With Judges on Menendez Retrial, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 7, 1994, at 5; Mydans, supra note 15, at A18.

22. In cases where an element of surprise was part of the original defense, this effect may be
heightened. Conversely, there may be cases where, even with depleted resources, the defendant
is better off on retrial because the prosecution has now revealed its entire case and strategy,
witnesses have disappeared, or evidence has grown stale.
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"private attorney general" recognizes that certain important rights
will be underenforced unless lawyers are given an economic incentive
to litigate. 23 Second, concern with attorney misbehavior has led to fee
awards that compensate the innocent party for expenses he has incurred as a result of an opponent's culpable conduct.2 4 In addition to
these behavior-centered reasons, another justification for fee shifting
focuses on the rights of injured parties and the need for make-whole
relief: if the cost of enforcing his rights is left to lie on an injured
person, then an award equal to the damages he suffered will provide
only a partial remedy.
Surprisingly, the various trends toward fee shifting in the civil
context seem not to have touched criminal proceedings. Perhaps the
presence of a "real" attorney general in the form of a prosecutor has
obscured the very real similarities between certain kinds of criminal
litigation and the sorts of civil cases in which fee shifting has become
common. In this section, I suggest that each of the reasons for fee
shifting in the civil arena has its analogue in the criminal context. I
identify four sorts of cases in which defendants are especially likely to
vindicate important societal interests or to suffer unjustifiable injuries
as a result of the operations of the criminal justice system. I then suggest that fee shifting may respond to the tendency for defendants to
underlitigate or for prosecutors to overreach. Indeed, the reasons for
fee shifting may be even more compelling in criminal cases because,
unlike their civil counterparts, they virtually never generate a new
source of funds for the successful litigant. Successful civil litigants
often receive damages awards that they may use to compensate their
lawyers; 25 the inclusion of money over and above the plaintiffs' economic loss-for pain and suffering or emotional distress or for puni23. The archetypal example of the private attorney general rationale is the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). As the Senate Report accompanying the Act explained, "If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910. See generally Bryant Garth
et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectivesfrom an Empirical Study of
Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 353 (1988); Carl Cheng, Comment, Important Rights
and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL L. REV. 1929 (1985).
24. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide several examples of this type of fee shifting. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (providing that the sanction for filing a frivolous or
groundless pleading may include "an order directing payment to the [opposing party] of some or
all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation"); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) (permitting a court to award the costs of proving a matter that
the other side wrongly refused to admit under Rule 36).
25. See Karlan, Discrete and Relational Representation, supra note 17, at 715-16.
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tive damages-may reflect a de facto recognition of the need for
attorney fee reimbursement. 26 Successful criminal defendants, by
contrast, receive neither explicit nor implicit fee awards.
A.

Constitutional Challenges to Criminal Statutes

Perhaps the closest analogy to the civil private attorney general
cases are cases in which defendants challenge the constitutionality of
the statute under which they have been charged. Defendants are especially likely to vindicate important societal interests when they raise
challenges to the very power of the state to criminalize certain conduct. Many of the most important equal protection and substantive
due process cases have involved the assertion of a constitutional right
as the defense to a criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court first announced the presumptive rule against racial classifications that has informed all of modern equal protection doctrine in McLaughlin v.
Florida27 and Loving v. Virginia,28 which overturned convictions
under state laws that prohibited interracial cohabitation and marriage.
Similarly, both Griswold v. Connecticut,29 which recognized a fundamental right to use contraceptives, and People v. Onofre,30 which rec-

ognized fundamental privacy and equality interests in private
consensual sexual activity, arose in response to criminal prosecutions.
A significant portion of First Amendment doctrine has also been developed as a result of criminal proceedings. 31 Cases such as Kolender
v. Lawson32 may protect individual liberties more generally, by restricting governmental discretion. Finally, although they do not protect individual rights directly, cases such as last Term's United States v.
Lopez, 33 which held that Congress had exceeded its power under the
26. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1390-91 n.72 (1995).
27. 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); see Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 255 (1991).
28. 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
29. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
30. 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951-53 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312, 318-19 (1990) (striking down the
Flag Protection Act of 1989); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 420 (1989) (striking down a
conviction for flag burning); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (striking down a
conviction for wearing a jacket bearing the slogan "Fuck the Draft").
32. 461 U.S. 352, 353-54, 358-61 (1983) (striking down a California statute requiring individuals to provide credible and reliable identification to police as violative of the Due Process
Clause because it vested too much discretion in the police).
33. 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626, 1633-34 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990).
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Commerce Clause, may be seen as vindicating the constitutional allocation of power.
Litigation of these sorts of defenses represents the equivalent of a
section 1983 or Bivens action. 34 Were an individual successfully to
challenge the constitutionality of a state or federal statute in a declaratory judgment action, 35 he would likely recover a reasonable attorney's fee-and that fee would be calculated using principles that
would normally result in an award far in excess of the statutory cap
imposed in a criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, an individual might
prefer to await a criminal proceeding rather than to bring an affirmative challenge for a variety of reasons: he might not want to alert the
government to the underlying conduct; he might be relying on a general policy of nonenforcement; or he might even be unaware that the
conduct has been criminalized until after he has been charged. It is
hard to see why the timing of his decision should affect whether he
must bear the cost of raising a constitutional challenge when the bene36
fit to society as a whole is the same in either case.
B.

Challenges to the Prosecution'sStatutory Interpretation

A second category of cases that vindicate important social interests beyond the protection of individual defendants involves prosecutions where the government is proceeding under a statute that,
although not unconstitutional, simply does not reach the defendant's
alleged behavior. These "statutory construction" cases ensure that
only those acts that the legislature intends to reach will subject individuals to the tremendous costs of a criminal proceeding. In McNally
v. United States, 37 for example, the Supreme Court reversed several

convictions under the federal mail fraud statute because it held that
the provision did not reach deprivations of "intangible" rights. 38 In
34. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395-96 (1971), and its progeny permit damages actions against federal officers for violations of
constitutional rights with "a damages remedy directly analogous to that available against state
and local officials under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983." PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL
RIGHTS AcnTONS: SEcTIo N 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 41 (2d ed. 1994).
35. If the prosecution has already begun, Younger abstention would prevent a federal court
from adjudicating the individual's claims. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); cf.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (permitting a declaratory judgment action in the

absence of a pending criminal prosecution).
36. The practice of release-dismissal agreements cuts down on the number of defendants
who will bring fee-generating section 1983 lawsuits once their criminal cases are resolved. See

Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1987).
37. 483 U.S. 350, 356, 361 (1987).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 836 F.2d 1312, 1313 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (revers-

ing a mail fraud conviction involving alleged absentee ballot improprieties on the ground that
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Dowling v. United States,39 the Court held that the National Stolen
Property Act did not reach interstate transportation of bootleg
records. Likewise, in Chiarellav. United States, 40 the Court reversed a

defendant's conviction for insider trading under the securities laws because it rejected the government's theory that all participants in stock
market transactions are under a general duty to forego actions based
on material, nonpublic information. This category of successful defenses may disproportionately involve cases in which defendants have
retained counsel, since many of the government's most aggressive
street
prosecutions involve white-collar and economic rather than
41
indigent.
be
to
likely
less
are
crimes, and these defendants
Both the constitutional and statutory construction cases can fairly
be characterized as prosecutions that rest on legal errors. Only legal
errors-by the prosecutor and, in cases where a defendant must challenge his conviction, by the courts as well-forced the defendant to
mount a defense. It is difficult to see why defendants whose situation
is purely a product of legal error-and whose ultimate vindication directly safeguards the rights of many other individuals-should be
forced to bear the entire cost of this effort.
C. Cases Involving Governmental Misbehavior
Beyond cases in which defendants directly vindicate important
legal propositions, there are also cases where certain defense costs are
fairly traceable to governmental misconduct. Occasionally, governmental misconduct may be the but-for cause of all the defendant's
expenditures. In a selective prosecution, but for the government's reliance on an impermissible factor-like race or the exercise of free
42
speech rights-the defendant would not have been prosecuted at all.
Selective prosecution is both difficult and costly to prove. But precisely because victims of selective prosecution may actually have comdepriving the people of Alabama of their "right to honest government" lay outside the scope of
18 U.S.C. § 1341), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988). I represented Mr. Gordon in this proceeding. Subsequently, Congress amended the statute to include intangible rights. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1346 (1994).
39.
40.
41.
gesting
legality

473 U.S. 207, 218-29 (1985).
445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980).
Cf. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Representation, supra note 17, at 680, 720 (sugthat many businesses have ongoing relationships with counsel to advise them about the
of contemplated conduct).

42. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-10 (1985). For an example of a successful
selective prosecution claim, see United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1539-41 (11th Cir. 1987)
(vacating and remanding the defendant's conviction for further hearings on his claim that he was
singled out on the basis of race), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988).
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mitted the offense with which they have been charged, they are
especially likely to be dissuaded from investigating and litigating their
claims by the offer of a favorable plea bargain. Thus, the government
may not be adequately deterred from pursuing selective prosecutions,
since it can induce many potentially successful claimants to plead
guilty. And even a victim who does manage successfully to litigate his
claim is hardly left whole-especially if he succeeds only after trial
43
and appeal.
More often, though, governmental misconduct affects only the
amount, and not the existence, of the defendant's costs. Whenever
governmental misconduct results in a conviction that is overturned on
appeal, the defendant's expenditures on the first trial are at least partially wasted." A defendant who has strained his budget to pay for
his first trial will be unable to afford the same level of defense at his
second trial. If he goes to trial a second time, he may be more likely
to be convicted both because the quality of defense he can afford has
dropped and because he has lost the element of surprise. Because
plea bargaining takes place in the shadow of expected trial outcomes,
the prosecutor may actually try to drive a harder bargain than he
would have sought prior to the first trial. Thus, reversal of a conviction can leave the defendant significantly worse off than he was before
the conviction was wrongfully obtained.
Brady violations-where the government improperly suppresses
exculpatory evidence 45-offer a good example of government misconduct that unfairly escalates defense costs. The standard for determining whether a conviction must be set aside is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the government's wrongful failure
to disclose, the defendant would have been acquitted. 46 The remedy
for a Brady violation, however, is not to order an acquittal, but rather

43. An individual may be able to recover criminal defense costs as part of the damages in a
malicious prosecution proceeding, see, e.g., Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384, 1389-90 (9th
Cir. 1988); Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833
(1970), or in a section 1983 lawsuit against government malefactors, see, e.g., Sherwin Manor
Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir. 1994), but both the difficulty of
proving each of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim and the need to bring a separate
lawsuit (and find a lawyer willing to prosecute it) may make this an illusory option.
44. Some of the investment in investigation and trial preparation is usable and the defendant may also benefit in the second trial from the revelation of the government's evidence and
strategy during the first trial.
45. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
46. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1567-68 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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to vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.47 At the
new trial, the defendant of course will have access to the improperly
withheld evidence, which by hypothesis improves his trial prospects,
but his resources will have been drastically diminished. Indeed, in
many cases where the defendant invested virtually all that he had in
the first trial, he will be forced to accept appointed counsel with all the
quality limitations that entails.
Moreover, precisely because Brudy violations involve concealment, they are hard to detect. Fee shifting may help to combat the
underenforcement of Brady obligations by creating an incentive for
attorneys to investigate and litigate Brady claims.4 8 This might be especially true if defense counsel develop a two-tier fee structure in
which they charge their client a fixed-fee retainer with the understanding that if the client prevails and is entitled to a fee award, that
award-calculated using a lodestar-may exceed the amount of the
retainer.
Perhaps Batson claims-which involve the government's improper use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors based on race
or sex49-offer the purest "private attorney general" rationale for fee
shifting in the criminal context. Much of what a defendant does in
challenging the prosecutor's use of her peremptory strikes champions
the equal rights of third parties-venire members. 50 Of course the
defendant's standing to assert these rights comes from his interest in
having his conviction overturned if he prevails,5 ' but again, it is hard
to see why the defendant should not be entitled to the reasonable
costs of establishing a Batson violation when presumably a juror who
litigated the same exclusion under section 198352 would be entitled to
the costs of vindicating her claim.

47. See United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (N.D. I11.1993), affd, 55 F.3d 239
(7th Cir. 1995). In Boyd, this would mean repeating a four-month trial. Boyd, 55 F.3d at 241.
48. A similar dynamic might occur in Strickland ineffectiveness claims as well where the
incentives created by fee shifting might combat the customary reluctance to challenge another
attorney's competence. See Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984).
49. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421-22, 1430 (1994) (sex); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 415 (1991) (race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-98, 100 (1986)

(race).
50. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15; see also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992).
51. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
52. See Bokulich v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 298 F. Supp. 181,183 (N.D. Ala. 1968),
affid sub nom., Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases
Finally, a defendant who has been denied constitutionally adequate representation also will be forced to overspend on his defense.
The reversal of his conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds does not
return him to the status quo ante: the money he spent on his first,
ineffective, attorney is unavailable for his second trial. Theoretically,
of course, a defendant who successfully appeals his conviction on ineffective assistance grounds could 'ue his attorney for return of the fee
paid in a malpractice action. 53 This theoretical possibility is overshadowed, however, by several practical considerations. First, it is often
difficult to find lawyers to prosecute legal malpractice lawsuits, particularly for newly destitute clients. Second, many jurisdictions require a
malpractice plaintiff to show not only that he was denied effective
assistance, but also to prove that he was actually innocent of the
crimes charged. 54 Thus, defendants who were essentially forced to
pay for litigation leading to two convictions when the proper number
was one are out of luck. Finally, even if a defendant can bring, and
win, a malpractice suit, the funds it generates will surely not be available in time for his retrial. That the defendant with retained counsel
selected his attorney, and even that he may have "settled" for a
cheaper lawyer with some level of awareness that this might reduce
his chances of prevailing, 55 does not mean that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to competent assistance. The Supreme
Court's holding in Cuyler v. Sullivan56 that defendants with retained
counsel can bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims because ultimately the state is responsible for the conviction 57 resonates in the fee
area as well: the state is also responsible for the fact that the defendant, innocent or guilty, paid for a constitutionally flawed proceeding.
Defendants vindicate important public interests by obtaining dismissal of all charges on constitutional or statutory grounds or by successfully challenging their convictions on grounds of prosecutorial
misconduct or the breakdown of a meaningful adversarial process.58
They are not, however, completely restored to the position they would
have occupied but for governmental overreaching or unfairness when
53. See, e.g., Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Mass. 1991).
54. See Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 170 Cal. Rptr. 533, 538 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980); Glenn, 569 N.E.2d at 785-86; State ex rel O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985).

55. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
56. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).

57. Id. at 343-45.
58. See Karlan, Contingent Fees, supra note 8, at 636.
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they have paid a heavy financial price for their victory. The same arguments that are used in the civil context to support fee shifting apply
to the criminal process as well. A defendant is more likely to invest in
litigating these important issues if his success does not become a Pyrrhic victory.
Moreover, lawyers may be more willing to undertake vigorous
defenses if there is the possibility of fee shifting in the end. The fee
arrangement in In re Olson 59 illustrates this point. Under the Independent Counsel Act, an individual who is subject to an investigation but who is not ultimately indicted can recover reasonable
attorneys' fees that would not have been incurred "but for" the Act,
that is, in cases where the ordinary prosecutorial process would not
have pursued the investigation. 60 Theodore Olson, who incurred
more than $1 million in legal fees in staving off an indictment, entered
into a fee arrangement with Jenner & Block under which he agreed to
pay the firm a retainer against an hourly rate; in return, the firm
agreed to accept any fee award made under the Act "as complete and
full satisfaction" of Olson's obligations. 61 Given Olson's financial
condition, Jenner & Block was gambling that they would succeed in
avoiding an indictment; otherwise, they were likely to be unable to
recover the full amount of their fees from their client. Without the
fee-shifting provision of the Act, a firm would have to treat a case like
Olson's as a pro bono matter.
Ultimately, the court awarded Olson and Jenner & Block
$861,589 of the roughly $1 million sought. 62 In deciding the reasonable fee, the court used the Blum v. Stenson63 analysis employed in
civil rights cases; it multiplied the number of hours reasonably expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate to arrive at an appropriate award. 64
59. 884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1) (1994); see S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3555. For an exhaustive examination of the Independent
Counsel Act's fee-shifting provisions, see Mark F. Schultz, Independent Counsel: Attorneys' Fees
Under the Ihdependent Counsel Act: How the Grinch Stole Lyn Nofziger's Wallet, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1311 (1992).
61. Olson, 884 F.2d at 1424.
62. Id.at 1418, 1430.
63. 465 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1984); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
64. See Olson, 884 F.2d at 1423-29. The Conference Report accompanying the 1994
reauthorization of the independent counsel expressed concern at the high hourly rates used by

the D.C. Circuit and suggested the court use a rate within the range set by other fee statutes such
as the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1994) (normally $75 per hour)
and the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1994) (between $40 and $75 per hour).
Even at these lower rates, Olson's award would have totaled well into six figures.
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Independent Counsel Act proceedings are not a perfect analogy
for the problem of conventional criminal defendants. First, the magnitude of the fees incurred by targets may in part be the product of the
lack of the customary constraints on prosecutorial overzealousness:
special prosecutors do not face the overwhelming caseloads and budgetary limitations that may lead regular prosecutors to forego dubious
investigations. Second, reimbursement in Independent Counsel Act
cases depends on the target's not being indicted in the first place, and
my concern in this section has been with formally charged defendants.
Nonetheless, some facets of the special prosecutor context provide at
least a partial illustration of the operation of a reimbursement system.
In particular, defendants who advance the sorts of claims identified in
this part-constitutional and statutory interpretation challenges; challenges to governmental misconduct; and ineffectiveness claims-have
every bit as much of a "but for" claim as targets of the special prosecutor. In their cases, but for critical failures in the criminal justice
process, they would not have been forced to spend significant portions
of their assets to defend themselves. Finally, the possibility of nearmarket level fee awards might encourage better lawyers to enter crim65
inal defense work.
Such a proposal might, however, replace a current disparity-indigent defendants receive counsel while middling defendants must
fend for themselves (sometimes no doubt thereby getting worse counsel, especially in jurisdictions with skilled public defender services)with the converse disparity: the "reasonable fee" available to successful litigants with retained counsel would substantially exceed the
state's noncontingent payment for appointed counsel, given the absurdly low compensation caps. 66 Harmonizing these two systems is
beyond the scope of this Article; suffice it to say at this point that a
huge disparity between a "reasonable fee" calculated in the customary
manner and the amount the government is willing to spend on defending indigents provides powerful support for the proposition that indigent defendants are currently receiving inadequate assistance of
counsel.

65. See Karlan, Contingent Fees, supra note 8, at 636.

66. See Vreeland, supra note 12, at 628 n.23 (compensation caps range from a low of $350
for a felony case in Arkansas to $3,000 for a felony case in Hawaii and from a low of $500 for
capital cases in Oklahoma to a high of $6,000 for a capital case in Nevada).
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III.

WHAT'S GOODNESS GOT TO Do WITH IT?:
THE ACQUITTED DEFENDANT

Should fee shifting extend to defendants who are actually acquitted at trial? On the surface, they seem particularly appealing candidates for reimbursement. "Actual innocence" frequently serves as a
justification for avoiding the otherwise harsh consequences of criminal
procedure. 67 Moreover, innocent defendants were charged only because the prosecutor lacked perfect information: had she realized the
defendant's innocence at the outset, prosecution would have been unethical as well as wasteful.
But to say that a defendant was acquitted is not to say that he
should never have been tried in the first place. Even aside from cases
of lawless or nullifying juries that acquit in disregard of or against the
weight of the evidence, the standard of proof required at trial-guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt-means that a substantial number of defendants who in fact committed the crimes with which they were
charged may nonetheless escape conviction. To the extent that they
are beneficiaries of the systemic bias in favor of false negatives, their
claim for reimbursement becomes less persuasive. Moreover, the
standard for deciding to bring a defendant to trial is probable cause,
not certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, unlike defendants
with meritorious constitutional challenges, for example, acquitted defendants cannot necessarily claim that the prosecutor erred. The decision to permit prosecution on the basis of probable cause means that
our society has accepted the fact that innocent people will have to
defend themselves in a way that society has not accepted the possibility of government overreaching or misconduct. It might be that acquitted criminal defendants are analogous to civil plaintiffs in cases
subject to fee shifting under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Those
plaintiffs are entitled to awards from the federal government only
when the government's position was not "substantially justified" on
the law and the facts. 68 A prosecutor's good-faith decision to pursue a
case against a defendant may be substantially justified even when the
prosecution ultimately fails if there was probable cause to believe he
violated a valid criminal statute and the prosecutor believed she could
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
67. For example, a habeas petitioner whose claims demonstrate actual innocence may be
excused from a procedural default. See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 860-69 (1995); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496-97 (1986).

68. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994); see also Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee
Shifting, 79 VA. L. REv. 2039, 2052-54 (1993).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:583

Thus, to my mind, acquittal alone is not necessarily a sufficient
justification for fee shifting, particularly when we take into account
the possible side effects of fee shifting for acquittals. To the extent
that such a world would resemble a contingent-fee regime, it might
create a conflict of interest in that attorneys whose recovery of a
higher fee depended on governmental reimbursement might gamble
on acquittals at trial rather than recommending plea bargains to their
clients. 69 Of course, to the extent that defense attorneys continue to
adhere to their practice of taking their fee up front this danger is minimized: the attorney is paid the same amount regardless of outcome;
the only question is whether, at the end of the case, the client receives
reimbursement for money already spent. Indeed, the increase in client pressure to go to trial that this regime might produce could combat the excessive incentive under current rules for attorneys to
recommend plea bargains. Still, the possibility of a two-tier fee agreement does raise a problem.
Second, one could imagine limiting fee shifting to defendants who
not only obtain acquittals but who prove their actual innocence by a
preponderance of the evidence. This could be accomplished either
through a post-trial proceeding or by reinstructing a jury that has delivered an acquittal. Having found that the prosecutor has failed to
meet her burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
could then be sent back to determine whether the defendant has
shown actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. 70 The
Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act, for example, provides something
akin to this option: "If a person charged is acquitted or the prosecution against him is discontinued, he may claim compensation from the
State for any damage that he has suffered through the prosecution if it
is shown to be probable that he did not commit the act that formed
the basis for the charge. ' 71 Similarly, successful plaintiffs in malicious
72
prosecution actions may recover the costs of their criminal defense.
Given the American system, however, post-trial reimbursement
proceedings run the risk of producing significant "satellite" litigation,
and consuming prosecutorial and judicial resources. On the other
hand, folding the reimbursement determination into the proceedings
69. See Karlan, Discrete and Relational Representation, supra note 17, at 713; Karlan, Contingent Fees, supra note 8, at 611-12.
70. Obviously, the jury should not be instructed on this issue prior to reaching its verdict on
the criminal charges.
71. Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act § 444 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
trans., 1992).
72. See supra note 43.
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on the merits might actually distort the trial, since a defendant who
knows that he must ultimately prove an affirmative case might litigate
differently and less efficiently from the perspective of a traditional
73
guilt or innocence determination.
The process of determining the actual fee award poses additional
problems. For example, what should be done with defendants acquitted on the top count but convicted of lesser included offenses or defendants convicted of some counts but not others? In the civil arena,
litigants may recover fees only on their successful claims-a principle
that has sometimes proved difficult to apply. 74 In the criminal context, though, it might be less justifiable to award fees for partial success. For example, if a defendant is convicted of manslaughter rather
than murder, should he be entitled to recover nonetheless for the time
his attorney spent preparing and litigating the issue of specific versus
general intent? It would seem incongruous to award fees for general
success when the defendant is nonetheless found guilty. On a more
mundane level, the prevalent flat fee arrangement between defendants and their counsel does not generate the kind of time records or
the sort of fee structure necessary for precise fee litigation. Thus, in a
number of ways, the factually innocent individual's claim for reimbursement will turn out to be knottier than the claims of some other
categories of defendants.
One approach might be to leave the question whether to award
fees to the discretion of trial judges who, having heard the evidence,
are in a relatively good position to determine whether the defendant
was factually innocent, was the beneficiary of favorable evidentiary
and burden-of-proof standards, or had a sympathetic or nullifying
jury. For example, a federal judge who grants a Rule 29 motion for
judgment of acquittal prior to sending the case to the jury75 may have
implicitly concluded that the prosecutor's case is so weak that it
should never have been pressed in the first place. Another approach,
which would have the virtue of easy administrability, if not of full
compensation to the defendant, would award defendants who are acquitted of all charges an amount equal to the statutory fee paid in
73. The potential for perverse incentives is even clearer in cases dropped before trial. If
defendants were to be entitled to attorneys' fees whenever an indictment was not brought or
dropped, prosecutors might face pressure to continue prosecuting, at least to the point at which

fees would no longer be awarded. See Schultz, supra note 60, at 1341 (suggesting a similar incentive under the Independent Counsel Act).
74. See Dan B. Dobbs, Reducing Attorneys' Fees for PartialSuccess: A Comment on Hensley and Blum, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 835, 836-38.
75. FED. R. CRiM. P. 29(a).
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appointed-counsel cases. While this would overcompensate "lucky"
defendants who were properly charged and should have been convicted and undercompensate truly innocent defendants who almost inevitably will have spent more on their defense, it would at least give
successful nonindigent defendants a governmental contribution
equivalent to what their indigent counterparts receive.
I confess I do not have an entirely satisfactory resolution to the
fee-shifting question for acquitted defendants, precisely because acquittal-unlike a finding of unconstitutionality or of government misconduct-communicates a somewhat ambiguous message. It seems
worthwhile, however, to begin asking whether, and how, the general
arguments for fee shifting can be adapted to the criminal context.
CONCLUSION

Most of the attention paid to questions of criminal defense costs
focuses, and deservedly so, on the incentives created for adequate representation of the vast majority of defendants who must rely on appointed counsel. For the most part, when courts or commentators
turn to questions regarding retained defense counsel, they focus on a
narrow range of criminal law ethical or tactical issues. In this Article,
I have suggested that some thought should be given to how, and by
whom, retained counsel should be paid and that fee-shifting regimes
in civil litigation may provide some insight into these questions.
F. Lee Bailey once observed that he had "knowingly defended a
number of guilty men. But the guilty never escape unscathed. My
fees are sufficient punishment for anyone."' 76 Thus, saddling guilty defendants with the costs of their defense may actually contribute to the
deterrent and punitive functions of the criminal law. But we surely
should hesitate before concluding that defendants who are subjected
to the criminal process solely on the basis of legal errors or government misconduct also deserve to be "punished" by being forced to
bear the costs of their defense. Just as society generally pays the costs
of the public attorney general who brings prosecutions because the
criminal law vindicates more than simply the victim's interest in punishment, perhaps we should also pay the costs of the private attorney
generals who vindicate more than simply the defendant's interest in a
fair adversarial process.

76. Quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 142 (Fred R. Sha-

piro ed., 1993).

